Somalia Affair

by **Trooper** Mon 12 Mar 2018, 6:55 am

Foundation for mefloquine awareness asks Trudeau to reopen the Somalia inquiry

GLORIA GALLOWAY PARLIAMENTARY REPORTER
OTTAWA

PUBLISHED MARCH 11, 2018

A foundation created to inform the public about the harms of mefloquine is asking Justin Trudeau to reopen an inquiry into the 25-year-old killing of a Somali teenager by Canadian soldiers who had been ordered to take the drug as part of an improperly conducted clinical trial.

The appeal to the Prime Minister comes as some veterans of the peacekeeping mission in Somalia say their brains were permanently damaged by the anti-malarial medication. It was administered without proper oversight and caused a host of reported side effects during the deployment, including anxiety, paranoia, depression, hallucinations and psychotic behaviour.

An inquiry into the killing of 16-year-old Shidane Arone, who died on March 16, 1993, was ended in 1997 by the then-Liberal government before the commissioner could explore what part mefloquine may have played in the brutality.

"We are requesting that the Government of Canada reopen the Somalia Commission of Inquiry to investigate the role of mefloquine poisoning in the events of that era, including in the beating death of Shidane Arone," Remington Nevin, the Canadian-born doctor who heads the Vermont-based foundation wrote in the letter dated Saturday.

"As we approach the quarter-century anniversary of this Canadian tragedy," Dr. Nevin wrote, "we encourage you to take action to finally address these unanswered questions related to mefloquine, and to provide a long-overdue measure of justice to the families of Clayton Matchee [one of the soldiers who was charged in the death] and Shidane Arone."

The Somali teen, who was caught sneaking into the compound of Canadian peacekeepers, was tortured and beaten over the course of several hours and succumbed to the blows.

Mr. Matchee, a master corporal, was charged with murder but did not stand trial because of brain damage he suffered during a suicide attempt two days after the event. One Somalia veteran who witnessed the beating says Mr. Matchee was hallucinating at the time.

Marj Matchee, Mr. Matchee's wife, is convinced that mefloquine is responsible for his actions. When Mr. Matchee took mefloquine prior to his deployment, "it was like he flipped a switch and became a completely different person," she said in a telephone interview on Sunday.

"He was horrifically nasty and mean and angry," Ms. Matchee said. "And then he stayed away and wouldn't come home and finally he came home just before he left and he said, 'I'm sorry it's this drug, I can't function right,' and I said, 'Well you're going to have to get off this.' And he said, 'I can't. It's orders from headquarters.'"

She said her husband, who has been confined to a Saskatchewan mental hospital for 25 years, had never been abusive before he took the antimalarial.

But, when he was on mefloquine, "I didn't know that man," Ms. Matchee said. "He was wild-eyed and weird and he choked me out in the middle of the night and had really bad visual nightmares that were still happening while he was wide awake."

Health Canada updated the warning labels for the drug in 2016 to emphasize that certain side effects can persist for months or years after the drug is discontinued, and some may be permanent in some patients.

The Canadian military conducted a review of the medical literature this year and concluded that there is no evidence that mefloquine causes long-lasting problems. But it now says alternative drugs are the preferred options for soldiers who deploy to countries where malaria is a risk.

Still, an inquiry is needed to understand what happened in Somalia, Ms. Matchee said.

It is needed to "address this illegal drug trial, address the fact that these soldiers were not allowed to get off a drug that was obviously impairing them," she said. "In order to right the wrong to all of these soldiers, the truth needs to be told. And for my family, we need the truth told."

The Globe and Mail

by **Riverway** Sun 19 Jan 2020, 6:30 pm

LOOK BACK: 25 years since Somalia affair stained Canada's reputation

Published Jan 19, 2020

There was a time when Canadian soldiers were universally viewed as the world’s peacekeepers.

But that reputation was badly smeared 25 years ago when some of this country’s elite soldiers, considered the best of the best, took the law into their own hands while serving to preserve the peace as part of a United Nations mission in war-torn Somalia, on the eastern horn of Africa.

The Somalia Affair, possibly the darkest period in Canada’s military history, resulted in the deaths of two Somali men, the charging of a handful of soldiers and, eventually, the disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, a rapid-reaction force of paratroopers created in 1968 that actually traced its lineage to the Second World War.

Additionally, it left the reputation of this country as a nation of peacekeepers in tatters and brought shame to the entire military.

WHAT HAPPENED

The Canadian Airborne Regiment was sent to Somalia, a hot and dusty nation wracked by famine, civil war and bloodshed, on Dec. 15, 1992, as part of a UN humanitarian mission.

Roughly 1,400 Canadian troops, made up mostly of CAR members, were airlifted into Belet Huen to preserve the peace while allowing food and other items to reach the native population, many of whom were starving.

Some of the Somali warlords resented the presence of foreign troops — Canada was part of the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) — and frequently attacked relief convoys and rebuilding efforts.

In March, 1993, just weeks after Lt.-Col. Carol Mathieu gave verbal orders allowing his men to shoot at thieves under certain conditions, two Somalis were shot in the back by Canadian soldiers while attempting to break into the base, a common occurrence at the time. One of the men, Achmed Aruush, died.

A week later, 16-year-old Shidane Arone broke into the Canadian compound and was captured. He was tied up and blindfolded then punched, beaten with a metal bar and burned with cigarellos for hours (he was later found to have burns on his penis), crying and pleading for the soldiers to stop. He was dead by morning, his last words being “Canada, Canada, Canada.”

Soldiers involved in the torture of Arone took “trophy” photos of the abuse, a horrific series of pictures similar to those that led to the American military scandal at Abu Ghrais in Iraq a decade later.

THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH

The story began to come to light just days after Arone’s death when one of the soldiers involved, Master Cpl. Clayton Matchee, tried to hang himself with shoelaces in his cell after being arrested for his part in the torture. Matchee suffered brain damage in the botched suicide attempt and was declared unfit to stand trial.

In May, 1993, the first charges are laid against soldiers in the CAR. A total of eight soldiers would eventually face court martial — Matchee and Pte. Kyle Brown were the only ones charged with murder — but just four were convicted. Brown was found guilty of manslaughter and torture and sentenced to five years; he served just two years before being released.

Lt-Col. Mathieu, the most senior officer charged, was acquitted of negligent performance of duties.

On Jan. 23, 1995, then-defence minister David Collenette announced he was disbanding the Airborne regiment.

But the fallout didn’t end there.

In fact, it started a couple of months earlier when a publication ban on Brown’s photos of the torture was lifted. Publication of the photos in Canadian newspapers led to the Jean Chretien government to order an inquiry.

During the inquiry into the CAR’s actions in Somalia, a series of videotapes showing members making racist comments or participating in hazing rituals came to light. That was the last straw and, effectively, the death knell for the CAR.

The $25 million inquiry ran until 1997. It discovered that senior officers altered documents relating to the Somalia affair before giving them to a CBC radio reporter. Days later, the inquiry showed that papers and computer logs had been tampered with to eliminate important information about what happened.

Much of the blame for the CAR’s actions was laid at the feet of the military’s senior leadership, with 157 recommendations made.

In the end, the disturbing chapter of Canadian military history ended with the conviction of four soldiers, mostly on minor charges, and a payout of $15,000 to Arone’s family.

Postmedia News

by **Navigator** Thu 06 Feb 2020, 8:50 am

History of the ’90s podcast: Remembering the Somalia Affair

Posted February 5, 2020

On this episode of History of the ’90s, host Kathy Kenzora looks back at the events, court martials and subsequent public inquiry that became known as the Somalia Affair.

In the early 1990s, Somalia was struck by a famine of staggering proportions, which was made worse by the fact that militia leaders were stealing foreign aid that was shipped from other nations.

The Canadian military was part of a UN humanitarian peacekeeping mission to ensure food and medical supplies got to desperate Somalis. Canada’s elite airborne regiment was deployed as part of the mission in December 1992, and within months would become involved in one of Canada’s ugliest moments in history.

In March 1993, a 16-year-old Somali boy was beaten and tortured to death after he was caught by soldiers sneaking into a military compound. Soldiers took photos posing with Shidane Arone after he had been brutalized for hours.

The same regiment would come under fire two years later, when homemade videos were released to the media which showed airborne commandos making racist remarks and taking part in a disturbing hazing ceremony.

To read more about the report mentioned in this episode, titled, Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, follow this link.

Global News

by **Lincoln** Wed 02 Dec 2020, 7:32 pm

War crimes: former minister reveals why Canada disbanded its special airborne force after scandal

The drastic step was judged the best way to fix systemic problems after an affair similar to allegations against Australian forces in Afghanistan

Christopher Knaus Wed 2 Dec 2020

A former Canadian defence minister who disbanded his nation’s special forces regiment in the wake of a war crimes scandal similar to that now facing Australia says the drastic step was the only way to fix systemic cultural problems and repair reputational damage.

The parallels between Canada’s so-called Somalia affair and the allegations against Australian troops in Afghanistan are striking.

The Somalia affair involved soldiers from Canada’s elite Airborne Regiment, who were revealed to have tortured and killed a 16-year-old Somali boy, Shidane Arone, in 1993, during the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the war-torn nation.

The Canadian soldiers took horrific “trophy” photos posing with Arone, which sparked national outrage and shocked Canadians, and helped prompt a wide-ranging inquiry and the subsequent revelation of separate videos showing soldiers making racist comments and taking part in brutal hazing rituals.

Like the Brereton inquiry, Canada’s own war crimes probe found systemic cultural and organisational problems afflicted the Airborne Regiment.

David Collenette became Canada’s defence minister in 1993, replacing his conservative counterpart, as the nation continued to grapple with its response.

In 1995, after the emergence of the videos, Collenette decided to disband the Airborne Regiment, transferring its three parachute battalions into other regiments.

Such a move is not being contemplated by the Australian Defence Force or the Morrison government.

In an interview with the Guardian, Collenette explained that he had come to the conclusion that disbanding the regiment and starting from scratch was the only way to address the deep-seated problems that had led to the affair.

Collenette – who was at pains not to tell Australia what course it should take – said that in Canada’s case, the cultural problems were so great that repair or reform of the special forces regiment was not an option.

“I’m not saying that just because Canada did it, other countries have to follow our lead,” he said. “But if you’re looking at the experience that we had, where there were … war crimes that ended up in convictions, and that it revealed a systemic problem with the institution from which the individuals came, then it seemed reasonable that, if you didn’t think you could really change the culture, then you needed to take a fresh start, which is what we did and it’s actually worked out.”

The disbandment of the Airborne Regiment was complemented by a suite of organisational and cultural reforms, recommended by the inquiry, which helped modernise the Canadian military.

“In a way the military still had a mentality that had been shaped in two world wars and Korea, and the Cold War, and we didn’t seem to have adapted to the changing global focus of conflict,” Collenette said.

He said Canada’s approach – disbandment coupled with major organisational reform – has been “very successful”.

No Canadian government – conservative or liberal – has attempted to re-establish the Airborne in the 25 years since. Instead, in 2006, today’s Canadian Special Operations Regiment was established, and Canadian soldiers have been deployed to high-intensity theatres, including Afghanistan, without any further allegation of war crimes.

Collenette said the disbandment decision was simply the only option that he was left with.

“It was very shocking to, obviously, the senior members of the military, defence staff, and the chief of the army and others,” he said. “But frankly, I think there was a feeling within the armed forces that something drastic had to be done, because there was a taint on the entire institution, which was unfortunate because like Australia, we had a great record in peacekeeping, we’d fought in world wars, and we’d never had anything like this.”

But Collenette offered a note of optimism. The Somalia affair is widely considered one of the darkest chapters in Canadian military history and seriously damaged its reputation as a peacekeeping force.

“Even when things seem to be broken, if you will, or a real challenge, you can make changes and you can turn the ship around,” Collenette said. “We did that, and in our case we made a certain decision on the Airborne Regiment, and that seems to have been accepted and it’s 25 years after the fact.”

This article was amended on 11 December 2020 to insert, for the avoidance of doubt, a sentence making clear that Canada today has a special operations regiment.

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by **Accer** Thu 13 May 2021, 12:47 pm

The lessons Canada's military didn't learn from the Somalia inquiry

Richard Shimooka , National Post
Publishing date: May 12, 2021

Exactly 25 years ago, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) were in the midst of a profound crisis with troubling news emerging daily from the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. Originally convened to investigate the brutal murder of Shidane Arone in Canadian custody during operations in Somalia three years earlier, it quickly uncovered evidence of mass hazing of soldiers and other troubling incidents, as well as a brazen coverup by senior officials at National Defence Headquarters. It ultimately resulted in the chief of the defence staff resigning after being implicated in manipulating documents for public release two years earlier, and a sweeping set of reforms to the military.

As the government announces a second independent review of sexual misconduct in the Forces, the Somalia commission and its outcome provides some useful lessons for this new review’s ultimate success or failure. The Somalia commission’s immediate challenge was to reform the culture of the CAF. It was effective at weeding out the immediate problems localized within the airborne regiment and significantly raised the military’s overall professionalization. However, the military is now facing a second, larger and far more diffuse crisis with deeply ingrained cultural roots. It points to broader systemic issues around leadership and accountability within the Forces that the Somalia inquiry tried, and failed, to address.

The Somalia affair was, in reality, two separate scandals — first, the immediate atrocities committed by the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia and its toxic culture, and second, the broader coverup that occurred afterwards. At every step of the way, senior officials sought to diminish the problem and obscure its reach, until it became impossible to do so. Overall, it highlighted a leadership failure within the CAF that pervades the forces to this day.

It highlighted a leadership failure within the CAF that pervades the forces to this day

Part of this is rooted in the reality that the military presides over a unique culture that must prepare soldiers to operate in a combat environment. However, it also can be attributed to decisions made in the 1970s that increased National Defence’s ability to administer itself with minimal political intervention. Instead of actually dealing with problems, the military often minimized or outright suppressed them from public view, reflecting the old adage, “no news is good news.”

The Somalia commission sought to change that and suggested several reforms to clarify responsibilities and increase accountability within the department. At first, this had valuable benefits; it improved the openness of the CAF as well as its ability to manage existing problems. Unfortunately, many of the commission’s recommendations were not followed. For example, it called for the creation of an Office of the Inspector General — an independent review and investigation body with a mandate to deal with systemic issues within the CAF and the legal authority to implement changes. Had it existed, an Inspector General might have helped address the various issues surrounding sexual misconduct that emerged over the past two decades.

Other recommendations made by the commission were reversed in the next decade, crushed during the broader organizational changes that emerged as a result of operations in Afghanistan. DND’s message control tightened significantly, ostensibly to ensure “strategic communications” with the Canadian public. The approach was effective at highlighting the professionalism of the CAF in the post-Somalia reforms in the theatre, but it also revived the relentless effort to control the narrative to ensure public support. That line can be drawn to the present crisis over sexual misconduct.

Ironically, DND no longer has to manipulate documents, which was what resulted in the chief of the defence staff’s resignation during the Somalia inquiry. Instead, the government’s Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) system is now so utterly broken that it’s not unheard of for information requests to take two or more years to be answered. In the aftermath of the Somalia inquiry, outside interaction with the department has become anodyne, with little actual information forthcoming.

This has certainly suited successive governments, which have abetted and even accentuated these instincts. One only has to look at the “gag order” placed on individuals working on the CF-18 replacement program, which was ordered to avoid further embarrassing leaks on a poorly thought-out government policy.

Any reforms require a full and transparent accounting of the problems in the Forces — the first instinct must not be to diminish, obfuscate or hide issues. This has already damaged the relationship between the enlisted and junior officer ranks and senior leadership, as well as between the CAF with the general public. While the new inquiry may resolve issues surrounding sexual misconduct, if the government does not address the broader issues of accountability and leadership it may find itself facing yet another serious issue in the not-too-distant future.

Richard Shimooka is a Senior Fellow at the Macdonald Laurier Institute.

National Post

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